A country that decides to fix its exchange rate thereby gives up control over its own inflation rate and the determination of the revenue received from seigniorage. If the country goes further and uses a foreign money, it loses all seigniorage. This paper uses an optimal inflation tax approach to analyze the consequences for optimal rates of income taxation and welfare of the alternative exchange rate and monetary arrangements.
provided by holding real balances,2'3 and from leisure, as well as consumption of a public good. There are no non-distorting taxes, and the government finances its expenditures through the issue of money and taxes on labor income. It is convenient to assume there is no capital.
The utility function of the representative household is (1) V = J U (c,m,x,g) et dt where c is per capita consumption, m is per capita real balances, x=-i is leisure (and is labor supply), and g is government spending; 5>o is the discount rate or rate of time preference.
The household budget constraint is
(2) c + i'n + (IT+n) in
where Jr is the rate of inflation, n the growth rate of family population, w is the wage rate, and t the tax rate on labor income. It is assumed throughout that w is constant.4
The household maximizes (1) subject to the budget constraint (2), and taking g, government spending, as given. The government budget constraint is M (3) g = twi + = tw + m + (Jr+n) UI where M/PN is the flow of real resources, per capita, the government obtains by printing money. (N is population). The analysis proceeds in stages. First, the household optimization problem, taking iT and t as given, is solved. I then note that there is no inherent dynamics in this model, since there is no capital accumulation, and that for a given rate of nominal money, 0, the rational expectations solution for the price level will have the economy jump initially to its steady state, in which th = 0 and TT = 0-n. The remainder of the analysis is therefore conducted under the assumption that the economy is in steady state.
At the second stage, a Cobb-Douglas utility function is used to study the optimal tax problem. For any given level of g, there is an optimal coubination of taxes to finance the spending. The optimal tax combination and its variation as g changes are examined. Finally, I ask what the optimal level of g is, under the assumption that the government maximizes (1), subject to the private sector behavioral functions and its budget constraint
(3).
The first order conditions for maximization of (1) subject to (2) are
where A is the multiplier associated with the budget constraint (2), and from (4), is also the marginal utility of consumption.5
Now, consideration of equilibrium paths in which IT, the rate of inflation in (6), is equated to the rate of inflation implied by solution of the full system (4)-(6) for given constant 0 will show that the only path that converges to a steady state is one that goes immediately to that steady state.6 Thus we can set A = 0 and work henceforth with the steady state system, (4), (5) and
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The general optimal tax analysis approach could now be applied but I prefer to use a specific, Cobb-Douglas, example to illustrate the relevant considerations.7 Assume Note from (9), that for an interior maximum with m>0, it is required that which is a measure of the share of government spending in potential (full time work) output.
Different combinations of 0 and t can be used to finance any feasible level of government spending. Locus BB in Figure 1 shows those combinations in t, S space, for a given value of p. The locus does not necessarily cross the t and S axes, since there is a maximum i that can be financed through exclusive use of either the income tax or seignorage. In particular, if there is no use of seignorage (0=0), then it is required that p When t=rl, the government is using the income tax to appropriate all income and government spending is given by8:
In the case of non-use of the income tax, maximum g is achieved as S goes to infinity and
P2
Since is likely to be small relative to a and y, the maximum steady state (g/w2) that can be financed by seigniorage alone is also likely to be small.
Use of the inflation tax does increase the level of output through its effect on labor supply; thus when the inflation tax alone is used to finance government spending, the level of output is higher than when the income tax is used to finance the same level of government spending. The BB locus shows combinations of t and 0 that can be used to finance a given level of government spending. But of course only one of these coiibinations will be the optimal tax combination for given P. Given t, e and g, the consumer demand and supply functions (8) -7-
which is positive. Thus both the seigniorage and the labor income tax increase as government spending rises. Corresponding to each point on TT is a level of government spending. Whether the TT locus crosses the 0=0 axis at t>0, as shown, depends on the sign of a(cz+y)-y, the right hand side of (18). Since is related to the share of spending on real balance rentals, it is likely to be small and thus the case shown in Figure 2 is more likely.
The optimum government policy is found by choosing the best point on Figure 2 . This is done by maximizing (17) approximately the observed racios of consumption to income, consumption to real balances, labor to leisure, and government spending to consumption, in the U.S. economy, the condition is not satisfied. Thus the current analysis does not give support to the notion that optimal rates of seigniorage can be high. In part, no doubt, this is a result of the functional form being used. It may also reflect the absence of a banking system in this model.1°S
econd, the analysis nowhere has had occasion to enter the variables S and i separately. Thus in this example the optimal use of seigniorage is independent of the rate of population growth.'1 The optimal steady state rate of inflation therefore falls one for one as the population growth rate rises.
Third, the optimal rate of seigniorage use, 0, is directly proportional to 6, the rate of time preference. If optimal 0 is positive, it increases proportionately with 6, which may be thought of in this context as the interest rate. If optimal e is negative, then higher 6 would mean a lower optimal rate of inflation, which is consistent with the optimal quantity of money argument.
II. Constrained Optimal Taxation.
The optimal position for this economy to be at is a point like A in Figure 2 . In this section I consider the effects of constraining the rate of money growth, 0, to a level B. Such a constraint would apply for example, if the exchange rate were kept fixed. In terms of Figure 2 , the government is constrained to the locus FF. Two questions about the rate of income tax to be used are considered.
First, we could ask what rate tf would be necessary to maintain any specified level of government spending, for instance the optimal level associated with point A. That is a purely technical question to be answered using the budget constraint (12).
The implied point B is shown, illustratively, in Figure 2 .
The second question asks what, given the constraint 0, is the optimal level of government spending. The answer is found by maximizing (17) with respect to t, after substituting in for g from the government budget equation (12), and treating B as a constant. The resultant locus, giving optimal t (and by implication from-(12), also g) as a function of , is
This optimal income tax locus, tt, in Figure 2 , is negatively sloped and lies above TT to the left of the optimal point A. When some seigniorage is taken away from the government, it optimally reduces government spending and increases its use of the labor income tax. Given the constraint on in Figure 2 , the optimal point is C. held to the level that obtains at A, lies below C. The utility loss from A to C can be compensated for by some amount of resources, which is not in general equal to the amount of seigriiorage lost in moving from A to C.
In the context of discussion of fixed exchange rates, that amount of compensation is the excess burden of accepting fixed exchange rates. Finally suppose that the revenue generated by seigniorage is no longer available to the government. This would occur if, for instance, the country used a foreign money. The maximal attainable level of utility is certainly less than that shown by C in Figure 3 . The government loses a source of revenue, and will again optimally reduce government spending below its level at C and increase the income tax rate above its level at C. The optimal tax rate is now (22) t= which is independent of e; however, government spending optimally increases with 0. This is a result of the fact that an increase in 0, which may be thought of as increase in the rate of inflation, increases labor supply and thus income tax revenue.
Corresponding to the higher rate of income tax when the government loses seigniorage, optimal holdings of real balances will be lower than the level corresponding to point C in Figure 3 , even though the inflation rate is the same. Point D in Figure 3 represents the maximum utility attainable when the government loses its seigniorage.
IV.
Exchange Rate Regimes.
The above analysis is relevant to one aspect of the differences among exchange rate regimes. The full optimal tax analysis presented in Section I describes the options available when the exchange rate is flexible. The excess burden imposed by the constraint on 0 in Section II describes one of the costs of adoption of a fixed rate regime which, however, uses a domestic money. The rate of money creation U in Section II is that rate required to maintain fixity of the exchange rate. Section III calculates the further cost of giving up the domestic money, using instead a foreign money. The rate of inflation will in this case too be consistent with the rate of money growth 0.
The ranking of utilities of these sets of arrangments is unambiguous.
Free choice of the rate of money growth is preferred to the situation where the rate of money growth is fixed at 0, with use of a domestic money.
Utility at point A in Figure 3 is undoubtedly above (or no lower than) that at C. Use of a foreign money imposes a further cost, implying that point D is below C in Figure 3 .
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